Abstract: This paper, on the basis of documentary analysis, examines the CCP's monopoly of cadre management. The basic question to be answered is what the relationships among the Party, the state and the cadres are through an analysis of how the Party manages the cadres. Constitutionally, both the legislature (the people's congress in Chinese lexicon) and the government have extensive authority in cadre management. In reality, there is no state autonomy in personnel, and the state exercises its cadre management functions and duties through the party branches dispatched by the CCP committees. This study shows that the cadre management system is still highly centralized, a heritage with which all the reformists have to deal. This is the background to understand the evolution of the system reforms both at present and in the future. This paper is descriptive, but creatively descriptive in that it depicts a picture of how the Party manages its cadres. his paper examines the Party's monopoly of cadre management. The basic question to be answered is what the relationships among the Party, the state and the cadres are. Constitutionally, both the legislature (the people's congress in Chinese lexicon) and the government have extensive authority in cadre management. In reality, there is no state autonomy in personnel, and the state can only exercises functions and duties in a very limited scope granted by the Chinese Communist Party ('the CCP'). The Party manages all the cadres directly or indirectly. "Directly" is used here in the sense that the party has the supreme authority to screen, investigate, approve, appoint, and remove important strategic cadres, and "indirectly" in that the Party, though exercising the genuine authorities upon cadre selection and removal, tends to cover up its real power over the legislature through "proper" legal procedures. The Party manages the cadres through three major means: ideological indoctrination, establishment, and organization. Ideological indoctrination through Marxist orthodox education plays a basic role in managing cadres as far as capturing their minds. Establishment control refers to how the Party, through its establishment institutions, determines the establishment of the party-state bureaucracies, the mass organizations, and the size, scale, and level of the staff of these units. Organizational control means that the Party, usually through its organization departments, controls individual positions and cadres. This paper mainly looks at the organization channel in cadre management, which can clearly demonstrate the supreme authority of the Party in cadre management. The other two factors will be examined in other papers. Three means of control have resulted in a highly centralized cadre management system, a heritage with which all the reformists have to deal. This centralized management system constitutes the institutional context within which the cadre-personnel reforms take place. It is the background needed to understand the evolution of the system reforms both at present and in the future.
down the administrative hierarchy. The provincial party committee manages cadres at the prefectural level; the prefectural party committee manages cadres at the county level, and the county party committee manages town and township level cadres. Finally, the town and township level party committee manages grass-roots level cadres (Manion, 1984; Burns, 1987 Burns, , 1987 Burns, -1988 Burns, , 1989 Burns, , 1994 Chan, 2004) .
The Party manages cadres also by department. This department refers to the functional departments of a party committee-organization, propaganda, united frontier line, and others. Among them, the organization department (OD) is the most important one. It is "most important" in that, for example, "even the most rudimentary party branch committee with only three members always assigns one member to organizational work" (Manion, 1985) . Melanie Manion remarks, "Much cadre management work is done by the organization department, one of the Party's most important departments, and the only one particularly assigned to personnel matters" (Manion, 1985, p. 209) In the center, one of the Politburo members of the CCCCP concurrently takes the post of director of the Central OD; at the localities, the OD director is, as a rule, one of the standing committee members of the party committee. The functions of the Central OD involve formulating and implementing cadre line and policies, directly managing young and middle-aged cadres, adjusting, deploying, and building leading bodies, and taking charge of cadre statistics. 2 At the localities, the OD formulates and implements central cadre policies, and takes charge of cadre appointment, removal, transfer, rotation, deployment, remuneration, training, and culivation within its own jurisdiction. 3 Melanie Manion (1985) observes that
The entire hierarchy of organization departmentsfrom the Central OD down to the organization departments of the various local and primary party committees-is linked in a professional relationship. Thus there is no direct line of command, bypassing the party committees, from the center to the lower levels of the organizational system. It is difficult to interpret what this implies for cadre management practices (p. 210).
In fact, the CCP's organizational principle requires party committees at lower levels to abide by the leadership of party committees at a higher level. A party committee exercises its functions in compliance with the directives, orders, and policies of the party committee at a higher level. Besides, the cadre management jurisdiction among party committee has been divided up already. So it is unnecessary to install vertical or line management in the hierarchy of organization departments from the center down to the localities.
The Party also manages cadres by departments in another sense. Management by departments means that the party committees and party core groups manage cadres in vertical systems. These vertical departments cover the functional departments, ministries, commissions, and offices of the party-state organs, and state-monopolized enterprises and public utilities, such as post, gas, rail, and civil aviation. Management by department also includes the judicial system, involving courts and procuratorates. The functional departments of the Party mainly include departments of propaganda and united front-line work. The department of propaganda is roughly in charge of ideological work, propaganda and education, theoretical research in the social sciences, mass communication media and publications, internet news communications, spiritual civilization construction, and the federation for social sciences. All the institutions related to the abovementioned areas are put under the jurisdiction of the department of propaganda. 4 Under the propaganda department are units and institutions related to education, culture, news and publications, television and broadcast, theaters, bookstores, internet administration, libraries, schools and colleges, hospitals, and many others. The department of united front-line work is in charge of affairs related to democratic parties, religious figures, non-party figures, entrepreneurs, overseas Chinese, patriotic personages in Hong Kong and Macao, and non-party membership intellectuals. 5 Concretely, the Department of United Frontline Work is in charge of news releases and theoretical research regarding united frontline work, cooperation between multiple democratic parties, national minorities, religious circulars, overseas Chinese, people from non-state-owned economies, and intellectuals outside the CCP.
Management by departments also refers to intra-governmental personnel management in systems like business administration, taxation, customs, and grain reserves. This is called vertical (line) management in some systems (xitong). So-called vertical management means that the party core groups of some intragovernmental institutions, mass organizations, and other systems of the public sector are in charge of the institutions, size of staff establishment, cadre management, salaries, and expenses of their respective systems, relatively independent of local party committees, or with local party committees assuming supplementary responsibilities. Under vertical management, authorities over cadres are concentrated in the central functional and professional institutions. In the administrative systems, a vertical management unit receives orders, orientations, and directives mainly from its vertically superior unit within the management and operational systems, regardless of local interventions, so as to ensure their independent enforcement of laws and regulations.
Leadership cadres in vertically managed systems are managed by their superior party core group (party committee). At the same time, they accept leadership by the local party committee. This is called dual leadership of cadres. The superior party core group (party committee) assumes principal responsibilities while the local party committee plays a supplementary role. The former party unit is called the principal-responsible party (PRP) while the latter is called the assisting party (AP). The AP assumes assistant responsibilities related to the above-mentioned responsibilities assumed by the PRP (The Central OD, November 15, 1991). The AP just plays a role in raising some suggestions, doing some supplementary work required by the PRP.
This study observes that a leading cadre is strictly controlled by the CCP, either by a party committee at a certain administrative level or by a party core group (party committee) of a functional system. The strict control is achieved through a nomenklatura system.
The Party's Nomenklatura System
What is a nomenklatura system? Harasymiw, when defining Soviet Communism's cadre system, describes the term as "a list of positions, arranged in order of seniority, including a description of the duties of each office. Its political importance comes from the fact that the party's nomenklatura-and it alone-contains the most important leading positions in all organized activities of social life." (Harasymiw 1989 ) The CCP has instituted its own nomenklatura system by following the former Soviet Union's model. When analyzing the CCP's nomenklatura system, John Burns (1987) considers it "the critical feature of the cadre management system," and defines the term nomenklatura system as "the instrument of the Communist Party control of contemporary China's political, economic, social, and cultural institutions" (p. 36). The system consists of lists of leading positions, over which party units exercise the power to make appointments and dismissals; lists of reserves or candidates for these positions; and institutions and processes for making the appropriate personnel changes (Burns, 1987 (Burns, , 1988 .
The nomenklatura is a confidential and inside document, which is not open to the public. To some extent, it is mysterious. Barnett (1967) remarks that "cadre appointments, promotions, transfers and removals were deliberated and conducted in an atmosphere of secrecy." There is no evidence to show that the CCP has ever publicly admitted the existence of its nomenklatura. When describing the principle of "the Party manages cadres," the official discourse tends to be vague and ambiguous, simply stating, "The party directly manages some important cadres according to management jurisdictions." A typical description of "the Party manages cadres" reads as follows:
That the Party manages cadres, mainly refers to that the party committees at various levels adhere to and implement the cadre line and policies, select and employ cadres strictly in accordance with the principles of the Party, and effectively manage and supervise cadres at various levels and of various categories. Concretely, it (the system of 'the CCP manages cadres') consists of four parts: First, it is that the Party strengthens the leadership of the Party on cadre work, and makes cadre policies; second, it is recommending and managing some important cadres; third, instructing cadre-personnel system reform; and fourth, conducting macro-management of cadres and supervision (retrieved January 1, 2004 from http://www.dqpi.net/zzb01/ homepage/ganbu/6.htm).
Though the CCP instituted its nomenklatura system in 1950s, no students could confirm that there had existed such a name list before 1983, until the publication of a pamphlet called "Questions and Answers on Party Organization Work." "Official reticence about personnel was broken …" (Manion, 1984, p. 3) . Literally and structurally, a nomenklatura is made up of job titles flatly and vertically covering the party-state organs, enterprises, institutes, and social organizations. The 1984 nomenklatura consists of seven sections: (1) Party Central; (2) NPC, Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), judiciary, procuratorate; (3) the State Council, banks, corporations police and diplomats, institutions of higher learning; (4) mass organizations; (5) local organizations; (6) institutions of higher learning; (7) enterprises and service units. The 1990 nomenklatura has seven sections as well, but its structure differs slightly from that of the 1984 nomenklatura. However, the 1998 nomenklatura contains ten sections, three sections more than the 1984 nomenklatura (Burns 1987 (Burns , 1994 Hon Chan 2004) .
Substantially, the CCP organization has absolute authority over the positions appearing on the nomenklatura in its jurisdiction, including nomination, investigation, appointment, transfer, removal, punishment, and rewards. The hardcore implication of the nomenklatura system is that the CCP has exclusively monopolized authority over cadre management. The government and the legislature have no autonomy in cadre management, especially the posts deemed important by the CCP. Any appointment or removal from these positions must be conducted on the basis of prior approval of the CCCCP (usually through its OD). Harry Harding (1981) 
remarks:
In authoritarian systems without active legislatures, the principal form of control over the bureaucracy has been the mass party, particularly its Leninist variant. The Leninist party exercises control over the bureaucracy by managing appointments and promotions, monopolizing leading posts, supervising the indoctrination of state officials, disciplining party members who hold government positions, and setting the bureaucracy's principal policy guidelines. (p. 16) This is exactly the case of China. The nomenklatura system is in fact an elite control system. The CCCCP controls only 4,000 to 5,000 top echelon cadres, which account for only one-millionth of the whole population. These ruling elite in turn control a huge cadre contingent in the middle echelon bureaucrats, and finally down to the operational level. A total of 6,932,000 cadres of the partystate organs are managed thus by a top-down-bottom pattern.
The State's Lack of Autonomy in Cadre Management
Constitutionally, both the people's congresses and other state organs have their respective authorities in personnel, which can be identified in the state constitution and other constitutional documents. The NPC is the highest organ of state power, exercising the following functions and powers to elect and remove positions of the state organs: the president and the vice-president of the People's Republic of China (PRC), premier, vice premiers and state councilors of the State Council, ministers and the auditorgeneral and the secretary-general of the State Council; chairman of the Central Military Commission; president of the Supreme People's Court; Procurator-General of the Supreme People's Procuratorate.
The permanent body of NPC is its Standing Committee (SCNPC), which also has constitutional power over personnel of the state organs. When the NPC is not in session, the SCNPC exercises its personnel power concerning appointment and removal of: the VicePresidents and judges of the Supreme People's Court, members of its Judicial Committee and the President of the Military Court at the suggestion of the President of the Supreme People's Court; the Deputy Procurators-General and procurators of the Supreme People's Procuratorate, members of its Procuratorial Committee and the Chief Procurator of the Military Procuratorate at the request of the Procurator-General of the Supreme People's Procuratorate. Additionally, when the NPC is not in session, the SCNPC exercises approval of: the appointment and removal of the chief procurators of the people's procuratorates of provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the Central Government; deciding on the choice of plenipotentiary representatives abroad (Article 67, Constitution of the PRC).
At the local levels, the people's congresses also have power over the election and removal of the principal leadership cadres of the governments and other state organs, adopting a similar management framework as the center (Article 62 and 63, Constitution of the PRC). The state constitution also empowers the government to manage its own cadres. The "division of labor" in personnel of the government is clear. According to the Constitution of the PRC, the State Council has the functions and power "to examine and decide on the size of administrative organs and, in accordance with the law, to appoint, remove and train administrative officers, appraise their work and reward or punish them" (Item 17, Article 89). According to the Organic Law for Local People's Congresses and Local Governments at Various Levels, the governments above the county level have the functions and powers to "appoint and remove, train, appraise, reward and punish the administrators of the administrative organs" (Item 4, Article 59). However, these regulations seem to be vague in that the governments exercise their functions and power "in accordance with the laws." What are the laws stipulating the role of the governments in cadre management? There are no authoritative laws which define the role of the State Council, only administrative regulations. In 1995, the Ministry of Personnel issued regulations defining the role of the governments at various levels in appointing and removing state civil servants. 6 According to these regulations, the jurisdictions of appointment and removal by the governments are very clear. Actually, all power over cadres is exercised by the Party organizations installed in the governments.
It is obvious that both the people's congresses and the governments have legalized procedures to appoint and remove cadres in their related jurisdictions. One can be sure these procedures have been enforced in reality. As early as 1983, the Central OD emphasized that Appointment and removal of the leading cadres of the state organs must be conducted in accordance with procedures provided by Constitution of PRC and laws. Any propaganda unit cannot publicize the appointment and removal of the leading cadres of the state organs until the legal formalities have been completed. (Central OD, September 8, 1983) Here importance is attached to "legal formalities." But "legal formalities" are just "formalities," monolithic and powerful in form, but not in practice. The party committee controls the people's congress and the government through its party core groups dispatched to these organs. A party core group is under the leadership of the party committee dispatching it. The elections are manipulated by the presidium when the people's congress is in session. The presidium establishes an ad hoc party unit, which receives orders and directives from its upper unit-the party committee that approves its establishment. In addition, it is the party committee that screens, investigates, and nominates the candidates for the positions of the state organs. Other organs including the people's congress are not allowed to screen, appraise, and investigate cadres.
The Party Core Groups in the State Organs
After the 11th Party Congress, the CCCCP reaffirmed that the party core groups should be installed in the party-state organs and the mass organizations (CCCCP, 1978) . The role of the party core group is very authoritative and powerful. "The party core groups in the central organs and the mass organizations may lead the party units of the subordinate institutions and may manage the cadres, and examine and sanction the appointment and removal of the cadres of the subordinate organs" (CCCCP, 1978) . According to the 2002 CCP Constitution, The party core group may be installed in the central and local state organs, the mass organizations, economic and cultural units, and other non-party leadership organizations. The party core group plays the role of leadership core. The tasks of the party core group are mainly taking the responsibilities of implementing the Party line and policies; discussing and determining the principal issues of these organs; doing a good job of cadre management; uniting with the non-party cadres and the masses, and fulfilling the tasks assigned by the Party and the state; instructing work of the party units of the organs the subordinate units. (Article 46, chap. 9) Additionally, "[t]he party core group must obey the leadership of the party organization that sanctions its installation" (Article 47, chap. 9).
According to the 2002 CCP Constitution, the CCCCP installed the party core groups in the NPC, the State Council, and other state organs like the judiciary. The relationship between the CCCCP and the party core groups of the central state organs are that of the superior and the subordinate. The subordinate must accept the orders and instructions of the leadership organ. That is, the party core groups of the state organs must obey the orders and decisions of the CCCCP, which sanctions its establishment. Then how is the party core group of the state organs made up of? Usually the top party member leadership cadres of an organ form a party core. The chairman and party member vice chairmen of the NPC might form its party core group. Among the 15 vice chairmen of the Standing Committee of the 10th NPC, five are democratic party heads and one is a non-party personage. So the party core group of the Standing Committee of the 10th NPC might be composed of a chairman and other nine CCP member vice chairmen. 7 This is the "leadership core" of the NPC, which might exclude the other non-party CCP member vice-chairmen in determining the work of "doing a good job of cadre management." A piece of news, entitled "The Party Core Group of the Standing Committee of NPC Learning Jiang Zemin's '1 July 2001 Speech,'" is a vivid addendum to the explanation of the party-state relationship to date. 8 The party core group of NPC began to learn (xuexi) Jiang's speech only three days after it had been delivered, when it was still controversial within the party (it is said). Then the chairman of the NPC, Li Peng, delivered a long speech praising Jiang's speech as a "classical Marxist document for the new and great project of constructing socialism with Chinese characteristics and advancing partybuilding."
9 This shows that the party committee leads the work of the party core group of the NPC, and the party core group of the NPC leads work of the NPC. All important affairs, like those related to the legislature and personnel, are determined according to this logic. The State Council organized learning activities four days after Jiang's "1 July 2001 Speech." Zhu Rongji (then premier and party core group secretary of the State Council), Li Lanqing (vice premier and deputy secretary), and other eight party core group members attended the learning session. Zhu Rongji, like Li Peng, highly praised Jiang's speech. He pointed out that "Jiang's important speech is abundant in substance, and of great significance. We must deeply study it, roundly understand it, and earnestly implement it." In fact, all the candidates, for standing committee members of people's congresses, heads of constituent functional departments of the governments, presidents of the courts, and procurators-general for the procuratorates, are "recommended" by the party committee (CCCCP, January 12, 1990) . The scope of cadres recommended by the party committee can be identified in terms of the nomenklatura. All the cadres appearing on the list are recommended by the party. The CCP claims "that the party committee recommends leadership cadres to the state organs is an important organizational guarantee to realize the party leadership upon the state affairs, and to maintain and consolidate the status of the ruling party." Operationally, the party committee will first solicit the mass opinions through "opinions polls". The result is not open. Then the party committee determines candidates for screening. The OD will investigate in details the conditions of the candidate. The party committee discusses these candidates on the basis of "organizational investigation", and chooses the candidate for recommendation, and then submits them to the party core group of the state organ.
12 Here, head of the government just nominates the candidates chosen by the party committee, and introduces the candidate to the people's congress. But judging by common sense, head of the government might know little about the candidates, since it is the party committee that screens, investigates, and recommends the candidate. Thus, "head of the government may either introduce, or entrust other related institutions to introduce the candidate to the people's congress." (Item 6, Article 4) Thus all candidates are "recommended" by the party committee and "nominated" by the government. The state organs are excluded in the whole process unless when they are required to offer some ideas and opinions. They are not allowed to set up an institution or organization to investigate directly cadres.
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After the recommended candidates have been submitted to the state organs, "the party core group of the people's congress should, in line with the recommendations of the party committee, ensure the recommendations of the party committee be implemented."
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What about the result of the party committee's recommendations then? A report by the Central OD to the CCCCP gives a vivid and authoritative description of the 1993 elections for new term of offices at the provincial level, which reads:
Thirty provinces, autonomous regions, and centrally administered municipalities have elected a total of 900 provincial level cadres. Among them, 272 are chairmen and vice chairmen of the people's congresses, 226 governors and deputy governors of the governments, 342 chairmen and vice chairmen of the political consultative conferences, 60 presidents and chief procurators of the court and procuratorates. Among those elected leading group members of the people's congresses and governments, and the presidents and chief procurators, 98.6 percent of them were recommended by the party committees. All the elected leading group members of the political consultative conference are recommended by the party committee. (Central OD Report 1993) This paragraph indicates that almost 100 percent of the total candidates "recommended" by the party committee are "elected". It is really an amazing figure. How does the party committee gain such a splendid accomplishment? "After the candidates have been determined, the second step for the party committee is to ensure their 'being elected'."(CCCCP 12 January 1990) The party committee achieves its objective through the presidium of the people's congress, and the party organization and ad hoc party organizations in the people's congress, or even in the delegations.
The Presidium of the NPC
The presidium of the people's congress is the leading body of the people's congress in session, leading and presiding over the congress (Organic Law of the NPC, December 10, 1982). It is "elected" at a preparatory session 15 one or two days before the formal opening of the people's congress, and exercises its functions in the course of the session. 16 Usually the presidium of the NPC is composed of the party and state leaders; the people of responsibility within democratic parties and the All-China Business Federation; people of responsibilitywithin the central party; state, military organs, and mass organizations; delegates from the special economic zones, Hong Kong and Macao, and other social strata; deputies of national minorities; and people of responsibility from each delegation. In a local people's congress, the presidium is usually composed of people of responsibility within the party and state organs, and deputies of various circles, and has a size of from 50 to 100 persons or so. Ad hoc party organizations are installed in the presidium even though it is just a temporary institution. According to a Party regulation, When the local people's congresses are in session, the congress presidium and each delegation should set up their ad hoc party organizations, and exercise their functions and duties under the leadership of the party committee. The primary tasks of the ad hoc party organizations in the course of elections are as 'propagating the party's cadre line and policies; introducing the personnel placement plan of the party committee to the party members of the deputies, and implementing the purposes of the party committee; and reporting to the party committee the ideas and suggestions of the deputies. (CCCCP, 12 January 12, 1990, Article 6) This means the presidium is under the leadership of the party branch in this period while the party branch is led by the party core group of the people's congress, and the party core group of the people's congress is led by the party committee. Non-party member presidium members are excluded in deciding major issues listed on the agenda of the congress, which include formally nominating candidates; dealing with bill submission and discussion; organizing delegations to examine and check the bills; determining the interpellation of cases and cases of recall; and so on.
17 This is one of the major interpretations of the amazing figure that "the candidates 'recommended' by the party committee are elected by 100 percent."
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Concluding Remarks
When talking about totalitarian regimes, Walder (1986) pointed out that There has never been a clearer image of communist society than that of totalitarianism. In totalitarian society, the party recognizes no legal or moral constraints on its actions: it strives for total power, total submission, and total social transformation as prescribed by its ideology. Aided by secret police, informers, and a wide variety of institutions designed for political communication and control, the totalitarian party pursues its aims by terrorizing selected elements of the population and keeping the rest in a state of habitual submission bred by caution and fear. (p. 2) However, things have changed a lot, and China is becoming more open to the outside world. The CCP is no longer what it used to be. The main task for future reformists is to abolish some characteristics of a totalitarian regime which Walder defined. In present day China, however, there is still an absence of the state's authority in personnel administration of state organs. The Communist Party absolutely monopolizes personnel power in screening, investigation, nomination, transfer, appointment and removal. The party committee mainly achieves this objective through organizational means. Dong (1992) points out that "The government personnel departments are no more than the Party's executive arm in personnel management." (p. 372). This is the basic feature of the Party's cadre system, and also the background of the cadre system reforms. There still exists overconcentration of personnel power in the Party, which Deng Xiaoping criticized over twenty years ago. The Party substitutes for the state in cadre management. The government and the people's congress just play the role of an aide or a secretary. Thus, there is no state autonomy at all. One can expect that instituting a state civil service in such a totalitarian regime undoubtedly has a long way to go. Interestingly, the cadre reform measures have come into being one by one in this context. 9 In Chinese lexicon, the term xuexi ("learn from" or "study") is literally used to refer to the authority relationship between a master and an apprentice. Politically, the term implies the relationship between a superior and a subordinate. The subordinate and junior organs and cadres are required to xuexi (learn and study) the directives, orders, speeches, experiences and others of the superior and senior organs and cadres, especially those of the political leaders like Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin. 
Notes
